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STENMARK, PLANTINGA, AND 
SCIENTIFIC NEUTRALITY 
Del Ratzsch 
In the preceding article Mikael Stenll1ark rejects both (a) Alvin Plantinga's spe-
cific arguments aimed at legitimating' Augustinian' science (or more generally 
'worldview-partisan' science) and (b) the legitimacy of such 'sciences.' After 
contending further that the Augustinian-science strategy is in any case not the 
most appropriate response by believers to the matters motivating Plantinga's 
attempt, Stenmark then offers an alternative strategic proposal of his own. In 
the following response, I briefly raise some issues concerning Stenll1ark's exe-
gesis of Plantinga, then take issue with Stenmark's philosophy of science and 
with the case he advances in support of his alternative proposal. 
(a) Introduction 
I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation for work that Mikael 
Stenmark has done in recent years - in particular, we are indebted to him 
for exposing and opposing the sorts of scientism underlying the work of 
many opponents (and even some adherents) of religious belie£.l But that 
said, although I think that there are some significant points of both useful-
ness and interest in his present article, my friend Mikael and I don't see eye 
to eye (more tooth to tooth2) concerning some things in that article. It is 
those points of difference upon which I shall focus in what follows. Some 
issues I raise may fall outside Stenmark's limited aims in this article, but it 
seems to me that they are issues that must ultimately be addressed. 
Stenmark's present aim is to show that Alvin Plantinga's case for the 
propriety of 'Augustinian' science (or, more generally, for any worldview-
partisan science) fails. Beyond that, Stenmark holds that Plantinga's con-
clusions themselves should be rejected. Stenmark's position is that world-
view, religious, or ideological matters should play no role in the evaluation 
of scientific theories, whatever role they might legitimately play in other 
procedures within science (hypothesis proposal, theory construction, 
choice of research direction, etc.). 
I shall begin by briefly laying out relevant positions and some disagree-
ments Stenmark and I have concerning just what Plantinga's actual views 
and arguments are (and consequently whether his case has been refuted). I 
shall then briefly argue that Stenmark's operative conception of science is 
(as I see it) inadequate, that his proposed position embodies significant 
problems including, oddly enough, a distant whiff of scientism, and that 
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the very brief considerations he suggests in support of his position do not 
in fact constitute significant support. Brief concluding remarks will follow. 
(b) Stenmark and Plantinga 
Plantinga's position. Plantinga claims that (A) science is not (in the relevant 
sense) the religiously neutral institution commonly believed - indeed, as he 
sees it, some science exhibits an inbuilt, active hostility to religious belief.3 
Plantinga cites two separate lines of support for this position: 
(i) considerations from Augustine showing that the "common con-
ception cannot really be correct" - i.e., that at least some parts of sci-
ence are inescapably worldview-colored4; 
and 
(ii) a number of examples that "suggest, wholly independently of 
broader Augustinian considerations, that science is not religiously 
neutral."5 
Plantinga holds further that (B) the believing community should pursue 
an "Augustinian science" - a non-neutral, worldview-partisan science tak-
ing account of and advantage of all we know - including religious-based 
truths we know. He suggests two lines of support for that contention as 
well. Such a science 
(i) would constitute a visible counter to sciences embodying natural-
istic suppositions, thereby protecting the believing community from 
unwittingly embracing belief-undermining influences, and would 
fulfill certain tasks appropriate to the believing community, etc.6; 
and 
(ii) would represent our best chance at getting at the genuine truth 
about the created cosmos.7 
That is not to say that believers should not also cooperate with others in 
neutrality-constrained CDuhemian") science - but the further need for 
Augustinian science still remains. 8 
Stenmark's response - outline. The main lines of Stenmark's overall response 
are that (a) cases of de facto bias do not establish the scientific permissibility 
of such bias, that (b) such bias should in fact be deemed impermissible -
i.e., that worldview-neutrality should (ideally) characterize science - and 
that (c) the believing community does not need an Augustinian counter to 
naturalist-biased science since such 'science' can be rejected as improper on 
grounds that it violates the worldview-neutrality requirement. (That viola-
tion sometimes - perhaps often - involves scientistic presuppositions.) 
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Preliminary remarks. Stenmark and I differ on some points concerning 
Plantinga's views and arguments. Although some of those differences are 
relatively minor", some are less so. For instance, Stenmark seems to read 
Plantinga's examples of biased theorizing as constituting the heart of 
Plantinga's case both for science being (sometimes) biased and for world-
view-partisan science being legitimate.1O If examples of genuine science are 
worldview-partisan, then obviously genuine science can be partisanY 
That does not, of course, imply that such bias is either inevitable or permis-
sible - Stenmark is right about that. But I think that Plantinga means to 
claim that in some areas, neutrality likely cannot be realized, and he takes 
Augustinian considerations to support that. Plantinga might be wrong 
about it, but he does at least claim that the examples are independent of the 
Augustinian case, and it seems to me that Stenmark does not really come 
satisfactorily to grips with Plantinga's claims concerning a uniquely 
Augustinian case (A-(i) above). In fact, Stenmark does not mention several 
of the publications which Plantinga specifically indicates contain his 
attempts to develop the Augustinian case.12 (In Stenmark's defense, I think 
that Plantinga is a bit thin on details here, and I think that it is easy to read 
some passages in Plantinga as employing the examples in the way 
Stenmark construes them. Stenmark could quite plausibly, I think, con-
tend that Plantinga simply begins by accepting the initial Augustinian posi-
tion without actually either making or even exhibiting that case, the full 
argumentative weight thus in fact falling upon the examples.)!3 
In any case, I am also not convinced that Stenmark comes satisfactorily 
to grips with Plantinga's contention that a science which acknowledges all 
that we know (including religiously) gives us our best chance at the truth 
(B-(ii) above - more on this later). But if key parts of Plantinga's cases are 
not fully addressed, then Stenmark's implied conclusion that Plantinga has 
provided no convincing reason to think that proper science can be world-
view-partisan, and his explicit conclusion that "None of Plantinga's reasons 
why Christians ought to develop an Augustinian science ... are therefore 
convincing" [my emphasis] are a bit too quick.14 
(c) Stenmark and the structure of science 
Stenmark's contention that Augustinian science is not needed as a counter 
to naturalistic science (since naturalistic science can already, on his view, be 
dismissed as violating the requisite neutrality ideal) is a successful 
response only if worldview-partisan science really is improper. It is not 
obvious to me that it is, and Stenmark provides no real case for it. Let me 
suggest why the sort of case Stenmark's counterproposal rests upon will 
not be trivial to make. ls 
The collapse of Positivism both partially resulted from and amply 
demonstrates that genuine full-blooded science cannot live on empirical 
data alone. Other conceptual, methodological and evaluative resources are 
demanded, and those resources are unavoidably taken from the surround-
ing conceptual and cognitive context, from the wider matrix within which 
science is embedded.16 Stenmark does acknowledge such non-empirical 
"intrascientific criteria" as "consistency, simplicity and explanatory 
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power." But consistency buys one very little, and both simplicity and 
explanatory power have surprisingly deep metaphysical roots - roots not 
just a priori worldview neutral.!7 A full theoretical science requires a rich 
metaphysical framework, and when proscribing resources in science one 
risks seriously truncating science's theoretical powerY Theoretical science 
may not, in short, be worldview-free. But if any functioning science 
inescapably requires infusion of some worldview-freighted content, much 
will depend (as Plantinga argues) on exactly what from which worldview 
gets infused. But additional conceptual structuring resources there must be 
- one simply cannot plausibly deny that. 
Granted that science of necessity presupposes some substantive such 
principles or other, there are two primary alternatives here. First, it may be 
that the resources required by a fully developed science go beyond merely 
the contents common to competing worldviews, but that different world-
views can provide different non-empirical packages, each capable of pro-
viding a complement of additional resources sufficient for some robust the-
oretical system. Since those complements differ, each involves worldview-
partisanship, presumably producing a worldview-partisan science plural-
ism. This, of course, is an eventuality Stenmark wishes to avoid. Second, 
some single, adequate complement of additional resources may be com-
mon to all relevant competing worldviews, so that although proper science 
is not worldview-free, it is worldview-neutral (i.e., conforms to the principle 
that "science ought not to grant a privileged status to any particular world-
view, ideology or religion in the sense of presupposing its truth"). In 
implicitly rejecting the first alternative, Stenmark is left implicitly accepting 
the second. In denying that "any particular worldview, religion or ideolo-
gy" should play any essential role in theory evaluation in science, 
Stenmark is implicitly presuming that whatever metaphysics is needed for 
doing science (at the relevant level) lies wholly outside the uniquely defin-
ing content of alternative specific worldviews, religions or ideologies - that 
science-essential non-empirical matters do not overlap the realm of human 
worldview, religious, or ideological disputes.!9 
Stenmark provides no support for this implicit assumption that human 
worldview disputes fortunately stop short of the realm of scientific evalua-
tively-essential metaphysics.2o In fact, I suspect that that supposition is not 
merely unsupported, but false as well. For instance, neither Cartesian con-
tact force theories nor the competing Newtonian action-at-a-distance theo-
ries were constructible just from empirical considerations (even including 
the specified "intra-scientific criteria"). Both - as do all theoretical struc-
tures - required additional principles, and both in fact rested in part upon 
(competing) theological conceptions. But both were, it seems to me, legiti-
mately scientific, and both sides were, it also seems to me, still doing legiti-
mate science even though rejecting their opponents' theories on partially 
theologically-rooted grounds.>! 
A few other related worries. (i) Stenmark's position requires not only 
that scientifically-essential metaphysics be pretty cleanly separable from 
(disputed?) worldviews/religionslideologies, but that various processes 
within science itself - e.g., theory development and theory evaluation - be 
cleanly separable as well. Such separability is problematic. (ii) 
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Stenmark's hint that science goes wrong and loses its ideal neutrality 
when "scientists' ideas ... are not merely based on accessible empirical evi-
dence"22 presupposes other problematic separations, potentially contro-
versial presupposition of the autonomy of empirical data, and in fact car-
ries some worrisome Positivist echoes. (iii) And Stenmark's apparent 
perception of how non-empirical factors function in science may not be 
sufficiently nuanced. The roles that various worldview conceptual 
stances play in science are often not just straightforward cases of scientists 
"accept[ing] scientific hypotheses because they fit their ideological beliefs 
or values ... or religious convictions." They often function far deeper - in 
e.g., 'plausibility structures', in subtle tilts of conceptualization and inter-
pretation, in thin tints of perception, etc. Although I will not pursue 
those questions here they are indeed that - very open questions. 
(d) Some problems in Stenmark's proposal 
Although he does not use the terminology here, Stenmark elsewhere 
endorses methodological naturalism as normative for science. 23 
Methodological naturalism is a non-empirical principle, and since it man-
dates rejection of some types of theories as scientifically illegitimate, it 
obviously functions in part as a criterion of theory evaluation. (In fact, it 
has been wielded with uncritical enthusiasm by opponents of Intelligent 
Design views.) Yet some people quite clearly embrace it for ideological 
reasons, and others as clearly reject it for theological reasons.24 It thus at 
least looks as though methodological naturalism (which, I suspect, under-
lies Stenmark's position here) is itself a non-empirical, possibly worldview-
driven evaluative criterion of the sort which Stenmark is concerned to ban-
ish from 'proper' science. 
Stenmark might object that that is not the level in the scientific conceptu-
al hierarchy that he had in mind, or that the disagreement in question is 
not a worldview, religious, or ideological disagreement in the sense he has 
in mind. Perhaps - although he has provided no explicit indication of what 
he takes worldviews, religion, or ideologies to include and exclude. 
Stenmark holds that although science should be worldview-neutral, sci-
ence can still be worldview-relevant (in the sense that "science has the poten-
tial to tmdermine (or support for that matter) any religious belief that has 
empirical content" [Stenmark's emphasis]). It is evident that worldviews, as 
Stenmark takes them, can contain empirical propositions or implications, 
and that such empirical content can be legitimately refuted by science 
(Stenmark's examples include geocentrism, young earth, and fixity of 
species). Here we have an asymmetry: when a scientific theoretical result 
conflicts with the empirical content of a religious (or worldview or ideolog-
ical) position, science can (at least in some - unspecified - circumstances) 
properly be taken as refuting that empirical component of the religious 
belief. But since religious (worldview, ideological) matters cannot, on 
Stenmark's view, legitimately be employed as evaluative criteria for theo-
ries in science, refutation can never go the other way, with worldview 
empirical implications undercutting scientific theory. The scientist's 
modus ponens can never - properly - be the believer's modus tollens. 
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Why should that be? Stenmark's expressed uncertainty about "whether 
[Christians] really know their Christian beliefs to be true," conjoined with 
his references to what "science has discovered", what "science can show to 
be false" what "science has refuted" [my emphases] lead one to suspect that 
Stenmark's philosophical views concerning the epistemic status of reli-
gious belief partially undergird his acceptance of the position that science 
can undermine empirical parts of worldviews but that scientific theories 
should be immune to empirical considerations going the other way - which 
has obvious potential to factor into issues of theory acceptance or rejection. 
That seems contrary to his own advocated principle, and the asymmetric 
stipulated priority of science over religious empirical claims but never vice 
versa, smacks just a bit of scientism. 
Suppose, however, that religious believers might (say, on the basis sole-
ly of revelation) actually know (or rationally believe) some empirical, sci-
entifically relevant empirical matter!:.. Given that as a worldview-parti-
san bit of information,!:. could not (on Stenmark's proposal) be employed 
in theory evaluation within science, even worse awkwardness would 
ensue. It is, of course, easily possible that the body of scientifically-per-
missible empirical evidence .E strongly favors some theory L but that .E 
conjoined with proposition!:. strongly disconfirms I. (That is a conse-
quence of Stenmark's claim that science can be worldview-relevant.25) 
Since, on Stenmark's proposal, one is forbidden to assume!:. true in one's 
assessment of scientific theories, one is presumably committed to accept-
ing I within science - since the permissible evidence .E strongly supports it 
- despite the fact that one knows (or rationally believes) a proposition 
which conjoined with .E utterly undercuts I. For example, suppose that 
the theory best supported by the empirical considerations Stenmark's pro-
posal classifies as scientifically admissible points powerfully to the eterni-
ty of the cosmos. On Stenmark's view, one could never be justified in 
rejecting that theory on the basis of a wholly religious conviction - no mat-
ter its rational justification - that the cosmos was created in time. 26 Again, 
Stenmark could claim that one can never know or rationally believe world-
view (religious, ideological) content, and thus that cases like the above 
cannot arise. But he attempts no case for that (at least here), and it is far 
from obvious that one must accept a proposed relationship of science and 
religion resting in part upon the supposition that we never know or ratio-
nally believe disputed worldview (religious, ideological) propositions. 
(e) Why accept Stenmark's proposal? 
I do not find Stenmark's attempts to motivate his proposal convincing. On 
the contrary, if barring all worldview-partisan content produced a truncat-
ed science, then if an admittedly - even unabashedly - theistic metaphysics 
could produce a full-bodied predictive, fruitful, explanatory science, what 
would be the motivation either for refusing to pursue it or for refusing to 
call it 'science'? Should the mere fact that it would be worldview-partisan-
that e.g., polemical atheists wouldn't like it - make the slightest difference 
to a Christian on the track of scientific truth? 
In fact, science may already in its very bones be worldview-partisan. Kant, 
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for instance, argued that one could not do science outside the context of an 
assumption of nature's designedness - an obviously worldview-partisan 
assumption. And the contemporary physicist Paul Davies has remarked: 
Science began as an outgrowth of theology, and all scientists, 
whether atheists or theists ... accept an essentially theological world-
view.27 
Justification for crucial presuppositions - uniformity, relevance of human 
cognitive resources, basic reliability of human sensory systems, intelligibili-
ty of nature - outside of a theistic context are not trivial to come by.2R The 
fact that atheists, naturalists, and others have co-opted deep theistic concep-
tual structures need not obscure the fact that they are theistic - that this may 
be a case where at least an Augustinian shape to science has won. 
In any case, the only other substantive consideration Stenmark provides 
for neutrality over, say, worldview-partisan (Augustinian, etc.) pluralism 
in science is a brief reference to historical cases of Christian-partisan science 
which were "as we all know" not only mistaken but scientifically counter-
productive.29 Although I will not pursue it here, I think that the history in 
question is substantially more complicated than Stenmark suggests.3U And 
that history is double-edged. Even ignoring the possibly If essentially theo-
logical" shape of science itself there were specific cases where worldview-
partisanship materially advanced science.31 Moreover, if a track record of 
failure of worldview-partisan science should cast doubt on that project, 
then since the history of science is in a sense a history of the serial failure of 
scientific proposals (the basis for the notorious 'pessimistic induction') then 
the project of scientific theorizing itself might be in some trouble. In fact, if 
the root problem is that Christians think they know various things by reli-
gious means when they perhaps really do not, then science - with its histo-
ry of alleged knowledge by scientific means of phlogiston, caloric, aether, 
polywater, the safety of hormone replacement therapy, and so forth - may 
have some questions to answer here as welp2 
(j) Some concluding remarks 
I wish to reiterate that I think that there is much of interest and value in 
Stenmark's article. However, in the interest of furthering discussion, and 
since my job is a critical response, I will finish on two additional notes of 
possible difference. 
First, I'm not convinced the Stenmark's proposal is really significantly 
different from other familiar views. It is a commonplace that in various 
non-evaluative procedures in science anything, including religious motiva-
tion, goes. For instance, one can propose hypotheses for any (or no) reason 
whatever. And it is equally widely claimed that religiously-based convic-
tions are illegitimate in evaluative phases of science - that e.g., theories 
shouldn't be judge according to conformity to one's preferred reading of 
Genesis. But those familiar types of positions, it seems to me, constitute 
the core intuitions of Stenmark's proposal. 
Second, it seems to me that an Augustinian science might indeed give 
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us the best shot at a genuine understanding of the cosmos - especially if it 
is both created and a cosmos. But even aside from that, the sort of world-
view pluralism in science which Stenmark opposes has potential attrac-
tions. Theoretical advancement in science is sometimes fueled by theory 
competition. Perhaps our understanding might profit from genuinely 
'world view-partisan science' competition.33 As cosmologist Andrei Linde 
recently put a related point: 
A healthy scientific conservatism usually forces us to disregard all 
metaphysical subjects that seem unrelated to our search. However, 
in order to make sure that this conservatism is really healthy, from 
time to time one should take a risk to abandon some of the standard 
assumptions. This may allow us either to reaffirm our previous posi-
tion, or to find some possible limitation of our earlier point of view.34 
Even if one were not committed to an Augustinian science giving us the 
best shot at truth (a commitment which I think a Christian can rationally 
have), letting a thousand worldview-partisan-science flowers bloom might 
still give us, as a metaphysically diversified scientific community, our best 
communal chance at tracking the truth to the "philosophical niches where 
[it] might lurk."3s And surely the task of producing the Augustinian contri-
bution to that diversified discussion would fall to Christian scientists.36 
Calvin College 
NOTES 
1. See, for instance, his Scientism: Science, Ethics and Religion (Aldershot, 
Burlington :Ashgate, 2001). 
2. This comes from an old Pogo strip. 
3. As Stenmark indicates, Plantinga believes that some parts of some sci-
ences may be neutral. Plantinga holds that the closer to issues concerns an 
understanding of human beings, the more likely non-neutrality becomes. 
Plantinga also suggests (but does not pursue, nor does Stenmark) the idea that 
there may be a connection between non-neutrality and degree of theoreticity. 
Alvin Plantinga, p. 178, "Methodological Naturalism?" in Jitse van der Meer 
(ed), Facets of Faith and Science Vol 1, p. 177-22l. 
4. "Methodological Naturalism?" p. 177-8. This is also the topic of e.g., 
Lecture 1 (p. 121-138) of "The Twin Pillars of Christian Scholarship" (here-
inafter "Twin Pillars"), in Seeking Understanding: The Stob Lectures 1986-1998 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,2001). In note 4, p. 215, "Methodological 
Naturalism?" Plantinga cites "When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and 
the Bible", Christian Scholars' Review XXI:1, September 1991, p. 8 - 32 (here-
inafter "Clash"), "Evolution, Neutrality, and Antecedent Probability: A reply 
to McMullin and Van Till", Christian Scholars' Review XXI:1, September 1991, p. 
80 - 109, (hereinafter "Evolution, Neutrality"), "Augustinian Christian 
Philosophy" Monist, vol 75 No 3, 1992, p. 291-320, and "On Christian 
Scholarship" in The Challenge and Promise of a Catholic University, ed. Theodore 
Hesburgh (ND: ND, 1994) as also representing his work on this point. There is 
very strong overlap - in some instances partial identity - among several of 
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these. Plantinga sometimes also cites Abraham Kuyper in this connection. For 
a detailed explication of some of Kuyper's relevant views, see my "Abraham 
Kuyper's Philosophy of Science" in Jitse van der Meer (ed) Facets of Faith and 
Science vol 2. 
5. "Methodological Naturalism?" 179. 
6. "Clash" 29-30, "Methodological Naturalism?" 187, 213. See also "Twin 
Pillars" p. 138. 
7. E.g., "Here I must emphasize [that] I am concerned with science and 
scientific hypotheses taken as attempts to provide us with truth: true explana-
tions, true descriptions, true accounts of various phenomena." [his emphasis]; 
"Methodological Naturalism?" p. 191. See also "Methodological Naturalism?" 
p. 192,211; "Clash" p. 28, 29, 30, 14; and "Twin Pillars" p. 145. And in "Twin 
Pillars", p. 132, Plantinga says that the naturalist "in rejecting or ignoring God 
... cuts himself off from the possibility of properly understanding us and the 
world". 
8. "Science: Augustinian or Ouhemian?" (hereinafter "Science: A or O?") 
p. 382-3, Faith and Philosophy, Vol 13 No.3 July 1996, p. 368 - 394. See also 
"Methodological Naturalism?" p. 210-11, 214. 
9. For instance, in professional articles Plantinga says repeatedly that nat-
uralistically-biased science (e.g., the Simon example) is legitimate [albeit 
wrongheaded] science (see, e.g., "Evolution, Neutrality" p. 83, 98-9; "Science: 
A or O?" 371, "Methodological Naturalism?" 183-4). Still, Stenmark canvases 
a number of positions Plantinga might hold that involve denying that it is 
proper science. Stenmark's exploration here is triggered by one comment 
Plantinga makes in a letter to the semi-popular New York Review of Books - a 
statement I tend to treat differently than does Stenmark. With respect to one 
such alternative, Stenmark does indicate that he "do[es] not think that this is 
the position Plantinga tries to persuade us to take ... " 
10. Stenmark says things like the following: "I shall examine critically his 
claims that science is not religiously neutral because we can find a naturalist 
bias in the work of contemporary scientists ... " "It is thus not enough to dis-
play cases where we can see that faith or ideology commitments have shaped 
scientific practice, to refute the idea of a worldview-neutral science." And in 
light of Stenmark's purpose being to engage and respond to Plantinga, I think 
it is telling that he says: "My point, however, is that even if we reject ... that 
actual science is worldview-neutral, we are not forced thereby to accept that 
science should be world view-partisan ... or even partially worldview-parti-
san .. " 
11. Stenmark, of course, takes them not to be examples of proper albeit 
worldview-partisan science - on his view, worldview-partisan science is there-
by improper. But that principle is part of the issue. 
12. "Twin Pillars," "Augustinian Christian Philosophy" and "On Christian 
Scholarship" - see note 5 above. 
13. Again, Plantinga's specific case here often seems to involve granting 
Augustine's (or Abraham Kuyper's) contention that there is a deep worldview 
struggle - that (in Plantinga's words) "the opposition between the Civitas Dei 
and the Earthly City is basic, fundamental, and serious," then drawing "the 
corollary drawn by Augustine ... : scholarship and science, taken broadly, is 
deeply involved in this ... battle." ("Twin Pillars" p. 139). That corollary is 
drawn presumably in light of the claims that worldviews are "total ways of 
looking at man and the world" (p. 131) and that different worldviews "perme-
ate the various scholarly disciplines" (p. 137). 
14. I would also like to have seen Stenmark respond more directly to 
Plantinga's discussion of worldview differences in assessing probabilities, like-
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lihoods, plausibilities, and the like (e.g., "Clash" 19ff, "Science: A or D?" 383 ff), 
as well as Plantinga's contention that in some cases worldview-partisan science 
can expand the theoretical alternatives open to science (e.g., "Science: A or D?" 
377, "Methodological Naturalism?" p. 185, 191). Plantinga's points here are, I 
think, significant. Concerning the former, Stenmark would presumably 
respond that in such cases one should give some neutral assessment of the rele-
vant (prior?) probabilities, and should not allow any worldview-partisan prob-
abilistic assessment into science. The problem, as I see it, is that there is no rea-
son to think that there always will be (or even can be) any such objective 
assessment - that the permitted 'neutral' resources do not constitute enough 
substance to permit a probabilistic assessment (other than a largely arbitrary, 
subjectivist one) at all. However, I do not have a rigorous case for that suspi-
cion - a fact of which Stenmark might no doubt make good use. 
15. Stenmark might respond that he is only attempting to show that 
Plantinga has not made his case, given that Stenmark's position is a possibility. 
Fair enough - although I don't think that Plantinga is clallning to have strictly 
ruled out all possible alternative positions. But some of Stenmark's remarks 
certainly sound as though that is what he takes the issue to be: e.g.," ... we are 
not forced thereby to accept that science should be worldview-partisan ... We 
can still argue that science ought to be free from ideological or religious consid-
erations" [my emphases] and in any case, Stenmark's consistently unqualified 
normative language - e.g., "What I am saying is merely that they should not 
claim that their Christian convictions ought to be considered a proper part of scientific 
theory validation. They ought not to maintain that Augustinian science in this 
sense is proper science." [his emphasis], "In conclusion, the regulative ideal of 
science we should accept ... " [my emphasis] - suggests that he is taking a posi-
tion much stronger than merely that this is a possibility. 
16. I have discussed this general issue in a bit more detail in Nature, Design 
and Science, (Albany: SUNY, 2001) ch. 7. 
17. Biologist John Tyler Bonner, in The Evolution of Complexity by Means of 
Natural Selection (Princeton: Princeton, 1988) says: "As has so often been 
pointed out in the past, a good explanation is one that gives some inner satis-
faction ... " [x], and notes that such satisfaction is provided by different types of 
things for different people. Philosopher Peter Kosso also notes that "the 
accomplishment of explanation, after all, is a psychological accomplishment." 
Appearance and Reality (Oxford: Oxford, 1998) p. 27-8 (see also 179). Physicist 
Edward Teller: "[understanding] is something personal and peculiar" Pursuit 
of Simplicity (Malibu: Pepperdine, 1981), p. 92. Obviously, assessment of 
explanatory power operates in a territory with a serious potential for world-
view impact. 
18. Stenmark might argue that he is proscribing not metaphysical 
resources, but rather only religious, worldview, or ideological resources. But 
then much will depend upon what distinguishes worldviews, metaphysics and 
religion - and Stenmark does not tell us in detail what he might take such dif-
ferences to be. (In his Rationality in Science, Religion, and Everyday Life (Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame, 1995) Stenmark's characterizations of "view of life" and 
"religion" differ only in that the latter involves "assumptions that ... express a 
consciousness of and a trust in the sacred." p. 243, 246.) Beyond that, such dis-
tinctions are far from trivial. Some of the issues involved in trying to distin-
guish e.g., metaphysics from religion are explored in my colleague Stephen 
Wykstra's "Religious Beliefs, Metaphysical Beliefs, and Historiography of 
Science", p. 29-46, Science in Theistic Contexts: Cognitive Dimensions, in Osiris, 
Second Series, Vol 16, 2001, ed. John Hedley Brooke, Margaret J. Osler, and 
Jitse M. van der Meer, If propositions are religious because they are believed 
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on the basis of religious commitments, or because of the tenacity with which 
they are held, then Stenmark's proposal may be further problematic. A num-
ber of the key operative presuppositions of science were proposed for exactly 
the former reason (e.g., the empiricality of science justified via divine volun-
tarism) and others (e.g., uniformity of nature) are typically held in the latter 
way. 
19. He is assuming something like what I have elsewhere called the "sepa-
rability thesis - "see my "Design: What scientific difference could it make?" 
[Perspectives, v. 56, no. 1 (March 2004) pp. 14-25]. It might be suggested that 
there is a third option - that different worldview-partisan inputs might ulti-
mately result in a single, common science. Stenmark, I take it, would reject that 
possibility - that worldview-partisanship need not result in worldview-plural-
ism of sciences. Accepting that possibility would remove part of the motiva-
tion for his view, and since the partisanship in question involves theory assess-
ment, at least in the shorter runs commonality is exactly what would not result. 
20. And even if that were true now in the current state of science, there 
might be no guarantee that that would remain the case as science advances, 
broadens, and confronts further challenges. 
21. Plantinga, following Duhem, refers to some examples of this sort 
("Methodological Naturalism?" p. 205ff). 
22. And, presumably, simplicity and the like, although Stenmark does not 
specifically append that qualification in the passage quoted. 
23. E.g., Scientism, p. 96-7, 131. For instance p. 96: 
Methodological naturalism lays down which sort of study qualifies as 
scientific. Naturalists, Christians, Buddhists and Marxist alike must in 
pursuing science be satisfied with this kind of explanation. 
In his Rationality (op. cit.), Stenmark develops a view of rationality having a 
strong social! communal assessment component, which may be connected to 
his preference for views shared across worldviews. 
24. As one example of the former, Harvard biologist Richard Lewontin: 
We take the side of science ... because we have a prior commitment, a 
commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and institutions of 
science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phe-
nomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori 
adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and 
a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how 
counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. 
Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine 
Foot in the door. 
"Billions and Billions of Demons", New York Review of Books, January 9, 1997, 
44(1). Here it is evident that Lewontin's restrictions on science grow out of his 
prior worldview stance. 
25. I'm assuming also some basic matters concerning probability. 
26. In e.g., "Methodological Naturalism?", 210-11, Plantinga seems willing 
to concede that results of Duhemian science could be incorporated intact into 
various worldview-partisan sciences. For reasons connected with the above, I 
suspect that he is wrong, but will not pursue the point. 
27. Are We Alone? (NY: Basic, 1995), p. 138. 
28. See, e.g., the last chapter of Plantinga's Warrant and Proper Function 
(NY: Oxford, 1993). Michael Rea claims to show in World Without Design 
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(Oxford: Clarendon, 2002) that naturalists cannot even be justified in accepting 
realism about material objects. 
29. I suspect that Stenmark believes for other reasons that worldview plu-
ralism would be detrimental to science, but he does not indicate what those 
reasons might be. In any case, if those reasons are pragmatic or practical, they 
would not entail the sort of normative prohibitions Stenmark advocates. 
30. Not only are there the familiar recent historical studies, but it has even 
been argued recently that the idea that Medieval Christian thinkers were flat-
earthers is a 19th century invention by opponents of Christianity. See Inventing 
the Flat Earth, Jeffrey Burton Russell (NY: Praeger, 1991). 
31. Brooke's Science and Religion: Some historical perspectives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge, 1991) is useful here. 
32. And that is not to mention anti-realist cases for thinking that science 
neither produces theoretical knowledge nor converges on such knowledge 
over time. That (if accepted) would undercut the response that science 
through its own processes at least eventually replaces its false theories with 
true. 
33. Stenmark does endorse the idea that science might benefit from alterna-
tive interests, sensitivities, etc. I am suggesting the possibility that there might 
be benefits to competition based on even wider differences - differences includ-
ing differences in evaluative resources. 
34. "Inflation, Quantum Cosmology and the Anthropic Principle" forth-
coming in Science and Ultimate Reality: From quantum to cosmos (essays in honor 
of John Wheeler's 90th birthday) ed J.D. Barrow, P.C.W. Davies and c.L. 
Harper, (Cambridge: Cambridge 2003), p. 24. 
35. This image comes from Michael Riordan: 
In this evolutionary metaphor, speculative tl1eorizing plays a crucial role, 
too, by helping to ensure that science investigates the many philosophi-
cal niches where truth might lurk. 
"Science Fashions and Science Fact", p. 50-51, Physics Today, Aug 2003, p. 51. It 
might be claimed that if consensus was supposed to emerge from such diversi-
ty, there would ultimately have to be global worldview-neutral communal eval-
uative criteria. That's one possibility, but I see no reason why the productions 
of some specific worldview-partisan science could not. trigger some 'paradigm 
shift,' inducing advocates of different worldview-partisan science to abandon 
their original evaluative criteria. If Kuhn is right, such shifts do not result from 
application of some set of already-accepted, shared, agreed-upon criteria. 
36. My thanks to Bill Hasker for the opportunity to respond to Mikael, and 
to Kelly Clark for discussion. 
